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SEX PUBLICATIONS AND MORAL CORRUPTION:
THE SUPREME COURT DILEMMA
ERWIN A. ELIAS*

The danger of influencing a change in the current moral standards of the community, or of shocking or offending readers, or of
stimulating sex thoughts or desires apart from objective conduct,
can never justify the losses to society that result from interference
with literary freedom. 1
INTRODUCTION

This proposition has not been expressly disavowed by any member
of the United States Supreme Court. On the contrary it has, ostensibly
at least, constituted one of the basic assumptions upon which the law
has been predicated, and its validity has been assumed by many of the
numerous commentators who have written on the highly controversial
and confused area.
The purpose of this article is to examine this proposition and its
ramifications. If, in fact, the state does not have a legitimate interest in
protecting its citizens from being shocked and offended, or sexually
aroused, or morally corrupted, what conceivable purpose can the state
have in attempting to regulate and suppress publications because of the
manner in which they deal with sex? The relationship between publications and overt conduct has not been and probably can never be
established, at least not in any clear and present danger sense. On the
other hand if the state does have an interest in, for example, maintaining the moral standards of the community, how has this interest been
accommodated by the Court with the First Amendment values involved?
Has this accommodation been realistic?
A full decade has gone by since the United States Supreme Court
first dealt with the validity of governmental attempts to regulate obscenity in the companion cases of Roth v. United States and Alberts
v. State of California.2 During this period there have been twelve major
Professor of Law, Baylor University. B.S. Marquette Univ. (1954), LL.B. (1956);

LL.M. Univ. of Michigan.
1. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38
quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Douglas in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509-510 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
2. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). An even split on the Court resulted in no opinions being
MiNe. L. REv. 295, 387 (1954),

[ 302 ]

1967]

SEX PUBLICATIONS AND MORAL CORRUPTION

"obscenity" decisions rendered by the Court.3 There have also been a
considerable number of per curiam reversals of state and lower federal
court decisions wherein obscenity was an issue, including seventeen
such reversals in the 1966-1967 term alone. 4 Despite all this effort on
the part of the Court it appears that the Court has not yet devised a
definitive and satisfactory solution to the problems involved in this area. 5
The Court itself remains deeply divided.6 After struggling for ten years
written in a previous appeal involving an allegedly obscene publication. Doubleday
& Co., Inc. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
3. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Manual
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964);
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367
U.S. 717 (1961); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); A Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965); The latter six cases deal essentially with questions of procedural due
process.
4. Keney v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 2091 (1967); Redrup v. New York, 87 S. Ct.
1414 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 2091 (1967); Ratner v. California, 87 S.
Ct. 2092 (1967); Austin v. Kentucky, 87 S. Ct. 1414 (1967); Colbert v. New York,
87 S. Ct. 2092 (1967); Shepherd v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 2093 (1967); Gent v. Arkansas,
87 S. Ct. 1414 (1967); Avasino v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 2093 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 87 S. Ct. 2096 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 87 S. Ct.
2098 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 2095 (1967); A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 87 S. Ct. 2104 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 87 S. Ct. 2105 (1967); Schackman v.
California, 87 S. Ct. 2107 (1967); Holding v. Blankenship, 87 S. Ct. 1418 (1967); Aday
v. United States, 87 S. Ct. 2095 (1967).
Only in the last case noted was the decision a unanimous one. A brief opinion was
written in the companion cases of Redrup v. New York, Gent v. Arkansas and Austin
v. Kentucky, supra. Probable jurisdiction in these cases was noted on various grounds;
but the basis of most of the reversals was that the publications involved were not
obscene, applying the Roth standard. In three cases during this term the writ was
dismissed on grounds of moomess, Jacobs v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 2098 (1967); Tannenbaum v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 2107 (1967); a procedural defect, Bookcase, Inc. v.
Leary, 87 S. Ct. 81 (1966); certiorari was denied in one case, Wenzler v. Pitchess, 87
S. Ct. 2096, and one conviction was affirmed by a 5-4 vote. Landau v. Fording, 87
S. Ct. 2109 (1967). Three cases remained on the-docket at the close of the term,
Phelper v. Decker, cert. granted, 87 S. Ct. 204 (1966); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
probable jurisdiction noted, 87 S. Ct. 1685 (1967); Ginsburg v. New York, probable
jurisdictionnoted, 87 S. Ct. 2108 (1967).
5. "The Central development that emerges from the aftermath of Roth v. United
States . . . is that no stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised
by this Court." Mr. Justice Harlan in Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (dissenting
opinion). See also Note, Obscenity and the Supreme Court, Nine Years of Confusion,
19 Str. L. Rnv. 167 (1966).
6. In the twelve cases cited in Note 3, supra the Court rendered some forty-eight
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to perfect a test for distinguishing the obscene, the justices today cannot agree even on what the original test means. 7 The decisions in
Ginzburgs and Mishkin' have thoroughly unsettled those areas of the
law which appeared reasonably well settled a few years ago.
The Court has been castigated by some for permitting and indeed
encouraging the increasing emphasis on sex in contemporary publications10 and at the same time severely criticized by others for its failure
to give adequate protection to First Amendment values." Even if one
has no strong feelings in regard to either of these positions it must be
conceded that the governing principles are vague and ambiguous and,
in some respects, wholly inconsistent and illogical.
The issues confronting the Court in this area defy easy solution, involving as they do a conflict between cherished free speech values and
equally cherished moral convictions. The most vehement critics of the
Court are inclined to ignore either one or the other. Nevertheless the
Court's rationale in Roth and subsequent cases leave one, I believe,
with the distinct impression that a vital ingredient is lacking. The
rationale obfuscates rather than clarifies. The critical underlying issues
have been only tacitly resolved or have been avoided entirely by the
two-level speech approach.' 2 It is readily apparent that in obscenity
cases, as in all cases involving First Amendment contentions, the Court
was and is faced with the necessity of accommodating competing interests-the right of free speech and the right of government to regulate
speech when a valid subordinating governmental interest is asserted.
That governmental interest must obviously be first ascertained and
separate opinions. In the three 1966 decisions, Ginzburg, Mishkin and Memoirs, fourteen opinions were written.
7. See text accompanying note 26, infra.
8. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
9. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
10. See Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New
and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1173, 1179-1180 (1966).
11. For recent critical commentaries see Semonche, supra note 10; Dyson, LookingGlass Law: An Analysis of the Ginzburg Case, 28 U. oF Pirr. L. REv. 1 (1966); Silber,
The Supreme Court and Obscenity: The Ginzburg Test. Restriction of First Amendment Freedoms Through Loss of Predictability, 21 RUTGERs L. REv. 56 (1966); Note,
More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L. J. 1364 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1965
Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966).
12. Very generally the two-level approach is based upon the thesis that First Amendment protection applies only to speech which has some social value. See Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REv. 1. This approach has also
been utilized in the area of libel, see Note, Dirty Words and Dirty Politics: Cognitive
Dissonance in the First Amendment, 34 U. CIH. L. REv. 367 (1966).
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evaluated before any meaningful accommodation can be made. In the
case of obscenity regulations a conventional approach would have required an inquiry into the primary objectives of state and federal laws

directed at publications dealing with sex. What evil or evils is government attempting to control, whom or what is it endeavoring to protect

and from what?
Although individual justices have directed their attention to these

questions from time to time,13 the Court as a whole has dealt with
them only obliquely. Rather the entire emphasis has been focused on
free speech values and the abortive effort to formulate a verbal test
to differentiate protected speech from unprotected speech and conduct.

There has been a conspicuous failure to define and articulate the governmental interest that was and is being either subordinated to or accorded

priority over First Amendment values. The balancing process has been
concealed by a manipulation of such relatively meaningless concepts as

"redeeming social importance" and "prurient interest appeal" while still
paying lip service to the proposition quoted at the beginning of this
article.
The definitional approach taken in Roth has proven to be barely
workable with respect to "hard-core pornography." 14 It has become
13. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957) Mr. Justice Harlan noted
that ". . . The State can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of
time the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential character of which is
to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral standards" (dissenting opinion).
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199, 202 (1964), Chief Justice Warren refers to
the right of the nation and of the states to maintain a decent society . . ."; and
to ...
society's right to maintain its moral fiber . . ." (dissenting opinion). Mr.
Justice Douglas has devoted the bulk of his opinions to the question of harm to
society and the purposes of obscenity legislation. See in particular his opinions in Roth
v. United States, supra at 508 (dissenting opinion); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 482 (1966) (dissenting opinion) and Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 424 (1966) (concurring opinion).
Various commentators have explored the primary purpose or purposes of legislation
directed at sex publications. See in particular Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 391 (1963); Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877 (1963); Kalvin, supra note 12 at
41-42; Slough and McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom Part 11, 8 ST. Louis
U. L. REv. 449 (1964).
14. The terms "obscenity," "pornography" and "hard-core pornography" are used
interchangeably throughout this paper. Legally the terms are synonymous although
individual justices from time to time refer to hard-core pornography as best describing
the type of material the Roth test is designed to isolate. See Lockhart and McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity, The Developing Constitutional Standard, 45 MiNN. L. REv.
5,63-64 (1961); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,499 n.3 (1966); Note, More Ado
About Dirty Books, supra note 11 at 1376 n. 48. In Lockhart and McClure,
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apparent, however, that society is not concerned only or primarily
with suppressing this type of publication. A considerable number of
the cases reaching the Court do not involve material which is even
arguably obscene within the definition worked out in Roth and subsequent cases. The controversy over the definition and suppression of
hard-core pornography is in fact probably now over.' 5 I believe, however, that this controversy has been only a preliminary skirmish. The
really basic and far-reaching issues are still to be resolved, and these issues
cannot be dealt with by verbal formulas. Specifically, the Court will be
confronted again and again with the question of what right the state
has to maintain contemporary standards of morality and decency and
with the problem of reconciling that interest with the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. It is in this context, of course, that an examination of the assumption contained in the proposition quoted above is
so very relevant. If these assumptions are substantially valid no further
accommodation will be necessary, and the decisions have probably
already gone too far in permitting speech to be curbed without apparent justification. If they are not valid the Court's present definitional
approach is simply not realistic and its continued use can only result
in more confusion and contradiction.
The basic thesis of this article is that the crucial issue in this area is
not one of differentiating between different classes of sex publications
but is rather one of determining and evaluating the state interest involved in regulating such publications, and, further, that the state
interest referred to has always related primarily to the prevention of
moral corruption, not of overt acts and conduct. I shall attempt to
show that the confused state of the law is attributable in large part
to the Court's circumvention of this crucial issue, avoiding thereby
the necessity of expressly affirming or denying that this state interest
may be paramount to free speech values, while in actuality the Court
has been continuously engaged in accommodating this interest and
these values.
Obscenity Censorship: The Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289
(1961) pornography is defined at 297 as follows:
Pornography is daydream material, divorced from reality, whose main
function is to nourish erotic fantasies of the sexually immature, or as the
psychiatrists say, to nourish auto-eroticism.
15. The decision in Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), and the per curiam reversals
in the 1966-1967 term, supra note 4, make it clear that a publication must be clearly
pornographic before it may be judged obscene on its face and thus be subject to
suppression. The decision in Memoirs is discussed in Semonche, supra note 10, at 11941196.
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RoTH-THE INITIAL ACCOMMODATION
Roth involved an appeal from a conviction under a Federal statute
_prohibiting the mailing of obscene matter."' In Alberts the defendant
had been found guilty of violating a provision of the California Penal
Code prohibiting the lewdly keeping for sale of obscene and indecent
books and writing, composing and publishing an obscene advertisement
of them. In both cases the Court proceeded on the assumption that the
publications involved were obscene. The majority 17 could thus limit
itself to the "dispositive question [of] whether obscenity is utterance
within the area of protected speech and press." 18 The question was
answered in the negative. Obscene publications were not within the
protected area because they were "utterly without social importance." 19
In reaching this conclusion the majority relied upon historical material
and language appearing in prior cases such as the following quotation
from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire."
... There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include

the lewd and obscene . . . It has been well observed that such

utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality...21
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) which provides, in part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile matter, thing, device, or substances: ... is declared to be nonmailable matter . . .whoever
knowingly uses the mails for mailing . . . of anything declared by this
section to be nonmailable ... shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense ...
17. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brennan. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren concurred but would stress the conduct of the purveyor, "It is not the book
that is on trial; it is a person.' 354 U.S. 476, 495. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Roth
and concurred in Alberts. He would distinguish between the authority of the State
and Federal governments to regulate sex literature and allow considerably more discretion to the State. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in an opinion concurred in by Mr.
Justice Black. See text accompanying note 44, infra.
18. 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
19. Id. at 484.
20. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The historical material referred to shows that 13 of the
original States had laws on their books proscribing blasphemy or profanity, that over
50 nations have joined in the "universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained"
354 U.S. at 485, that all 48 states have laws against obscenity and that the U.S. Congress
has enacted 20 obscenity laws between 1842 and 1956.
21. 315 U.S. at 571-572 (1942).
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The defendants' contention that their constitutional rights were violated "because convictions may be had without proof either that obscene material will perceptibly create a clear and present danger of
anti-social conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct" 22 was easily avoided by the majority. Since obscenity is not
protected speech there is no need on the part of the state to show a
clear and present danger of anything. Nor is there any need to determine whether the regulations are too vague or overbroad, considerations which would be important only where it is necessary to balance
protected speech against the right of the state to regulate it.23 No express weighing of competing interests was deemed necessary in the case
of obscene utterances. Such utterances are not only outside the protection afforded by the First Amendment but they are subject to complete suppression by the state because of the danger they represent to
society.
Of equal and probably greater significance was the Court's determination that sex and obscenity were not synonymous. Non-obscene
publications dealing with sex were entitled to protection because they
involve the conveying of ideas on a "subject of absorbing interest to
mankind through the ages . . . one of the vital problems of human
interest and public concern." 24Whatever dangers to society such
publications may result in they are protected because of this redeeming
social importance.
Having established these principles all that remained was to formulate
a satisfactory test to isolate the obscene from the non-obscene. A publication is obscene, according to the Court, when ". . . to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 25
Subsequent decisions have elaborated upon the definition, and the
views of the justices with respect to its proper interpretation is succinctly summed up in the following quotation from one of the 19661967 term per curiam opinions:
Two members of the Court have consistently adhered to the
view that a State is utterly without power to suppress, control or
22.
23.
24.
25.

354 U.S. at 486.
See Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
Id. at 487.
Id. at 489.
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punish the distribution of any writings or pictures upon the
ground of their "obscenity". A third has held to the opinion that a
State's power in this area is narrowly limited to a distinct and
clearly identifiable class of material. Others have subscribed to a
not dissimilar standard, holding that a State may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary material as obscene unless:
"(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value," emphasizing
that the "three elements must coalesce," and that no such material
can be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value" ..... Another Justice has not viewed the "social
value" element as an independent factor in the judgment of ob26
scenity.
It is conceded by everyone, including the members of the Court,2 7
that the test for distinguishing obscenity is anything but clear, either
intrinsically or in relation to the subject matter to which it is to be
applied, regardless of which variation of the test is adopted. Who is
the "average person" and by whom and how is he to be determined?
Who is to determine whether material is patently offensive and by what
standard? Is the contemporary community referred to local, statewide,
or national? What relationship is there between "dominant theme" and
isolated portions of the publication, that is, will a theme of redeeming
social importance protect the entire publication from governmental suppression? What is meant by "prurient interest" appeal, and how can
material be patently offensive and appealing to the prurient interest at
the same time? Presumably repulsion is as inimicable to sexual arousal
as humor is purported to be, 28 and if we confine our inquiry to the
effect of the publication on the average man we are met with what
appears to be patent contradiction. Is it even necessary to consider the
26. Redrup v. New York, Austin v. Kentucky, Gent v. Arkansas, 87 S. Ct. 1414,
1416 (1967). The writs of certiorari in Redrup and Austin were granted to review the

application of scienter requirement to convictions of booksellers. In Gent the validity of
a comprehensive state law was attacked on vagueness grounds. The majority reversed
on the basis that the publications involved were not obscene.
27. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("test . . . is not perfect);
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475 n. 19 (1966) ("inherent residual vagueness").
28. KRONHAUSEN AND KRONHAusEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE

LAw 55-56 (Rev. ed 1964).
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effect of the material or is the court to judge the material on its face
alone?29
I leave these questions however, as I am here concerned not with the
ambiguity and vagueness of the definition, but rather with the attempted
accommodation of competing interests it represents. In essence the
Court held that the only enforceable state interest in this area is to
proscribe and suppress the dissemination of patently offensive material,
the dominant theme of which appealed to the prurient interest of the
average person. The justices apparently had in mind only what one
justice refers to as "hard-core pornography . . . I know it when I see
it .. ." 30 When hard-core pornography is not involved the state's interest is subordinated to free speech values. It is totally irrelevant
whether the state's regulations were intended to apply only to pornography or whether the language of the specific statute involved
even lends itself to this limited construction." It can be used against
pornography or not at all.
The Court evidently recognized in Roth that sex publications,
whether obscene or not within the definition formulated by the
Court, involve some danger to society. The qualifying term "redeeming" was employed with reference to both the obscene and nonobscene. In the case of the former the vices outweigh the virtues but in
the case of non-obscene its social importance made amends for whatever evils it caused. This is where the Court stopped. Other than the
cryptic reference to "social interest in order and morality" 32 the majority opinion contains no hint of what these vices and evils might be
that justify the limitation on speech sanctioned by the decision.
29. There are numerous articles exploring these questions and attempting to provide
answers or at least guidance. Probably the most prominent and influential treatments
are those by Professors Lockhart & McClure, Literature,the Law of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 38 MiNN. L. REv. 295 (1954); Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 5 (1960); Obscenity Censorship: The Core
Constitutional Issue-What Is Obscene? 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961).
30. Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring
opinion). See note 14, supra.
31. Note the contrasting language of the two statutes involved in Roth, "tendency
to deprave or corrupt its readers" in the state statute and tendency "to stir sexual
impulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts" in the federal statute. Mr. Justice
Harlan points out that ". . . the Court merely assimilates the various tests into one
indiscriminate pot pourri." 354 U.S. at 500. State statutes typically employ various
adjectives in the obscenity laws. See Note, More Ado About Dirty Boooks, supra
note 11, Appendix III.
32. Quoting the language of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 571-572 (1942).
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There is obviously no objective criterion for evaluating either social
importance or redeeming social importance. A determination in this
area has to be a value judgment which one can accept or reject but

hardly prove or disprove. Many people clearly derive at least some
measure of satisfaction, perhaps considerably more,-s from reading and

viewing hard-core pornography. This fact alone would tend to show
that such publications have as much social value as any form of enter-

tainment and whether treated as free speech or not, should be left
34
unregulated in the absence of some evidence of overriding state interest,

But the fact of the matter is that such publications are speech, and
speech is or should be protected by the First Amendment whether
it be socially important or not. This much would appear to be implicit
in the guarantee of free speech; that speech needs no social importance

to be entitled to freedom from suppression and penal sanctions. "The
majority in Roth may have sidestepped this basic principle but the
critics certainly haven't overlooked it.

On the other hand, if pornography has no social importance it is
not at all clear what distinguishes it from many of the publications thus

far held to be non-obscene. If social importance is equated to discussions
of "matters of public concern" 3u and the supplying of "the public need
for information and education with respect to the significant issues of
the times",a" it is not readily apparent that "girlie" magazines or movies
depicting sexual promiscuity3 7 contain much in the way of social value
33. In Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Mr. Justice Douglas suggests that pornography
may provide an outlet for drives which might otherwise lead to anti-social conduct.
Id. at 432 (concurring opinion). See also Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYmn L. REv. 655 (1964).
34. This thesis is fully developed in the provocative article. Henkin, Morals and
the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 391, 402-407 (1963). See note
49, infra.
35. 354 U.S. at 488, quoting from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940).
36. Id.
37. I have in mind such motion pictures as "The Game of Love" described by
the Circuit Court of Appeals as follows:
(A) 16 year old boy is shown completely nude on a bathing beach in the
presence of a group of younger girls (as a result of a boating accident).
On that plane the narrative proceeds to reveal the seduction of this boy
by a physically attractive woman old enough to be his mother. Under
the influence of this experience and an arrangement to repeat it, the boy
thereupon engages in sexual relations with a girl of his own age. The
erotic thread of the story is carried, without deviation toward any wholesome idea, through scene after scene. The narrative is graphically pictured
with nothing omitted except those sexual consummations which are plainly
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that is lacking in hard-core pornography. The primary object of the
publishers is to commercially exploit sex and the educational and informative function is at best incidental to this primary goal. This is
perhaps painting with too broad a brush, but I must confess that I am
not at all impressed with the position of those commentators who characterize the writers, publishers and producers of sexually-laced publi8
cations as modern day Thomas Paines.3
In any event little is to be gained in terms of understanding the competing interests the Court was reconciling from examining the concept
of social importance. The determination of whether it exists or not
with respect to a particular publication or class of publications can
only be subjective conclusion based upon unarticulated personal predilection. One need only compare the views of Justices Douglas and
Clark in Memoirs 9 to corroborate this point. Moreover, the state has
no conceivable interest in suppressing speech merely because it lacks
social importance. The factor of social importance acquires a meaning
only within the context of a balancing process and here one of the
prerequisites is missing. The Court has not explained what it was
balancing, why the state should be permitted to suppress pornography
or why it should be limited to pornography in exercising its regulatory
powers.
The concept of prurient interest appeal is not particularly helpful
either. In the first place it is not at all clear what precisely is meant
by prurient interest appeal and the Court in Roth was willing to accept
any number of definitions.4 Quoted with apparent approval was the
suggested but meaningfully omitted and thus, by the very fact of omission,
emphasized.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1957), reversed,
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
38. See, e.g., Hugh Heffner's Playboy Philosophy which appears regularly in PLAYBOY
MAGAZINE, a publication to which few need introduction. Conversely the Court's
decisions and views which do not accord with an absolutist approach to First Amendment issues are characterized as misguided, insensitive, undemocratic, intolerant, prudish,
hypocritical, outdated, and with terms of similar import.
39. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Mr. Justice Douglas attached an address by a clergyman to
his concurring opinion. The address favorably compares Fanny Hill with the work of
Norman Vincent Peale and in fact suggested that Fanny Hill "represents a more
significant view of morality than is represented by Dr. Peale's book, Sin, Sex and SelfControl." Id. at 436. Mr. Justice Clark found the book more than he could stomach
and concluded that it was clearly hard-core pornography. Id. at 441 (dissenting
opinion).
40. 354 U.S. 476, 487 n. 20. See Lockhart and McClure, supra note 29, 45 MINN. L.
Rav. 5, 56-58. (1960).
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following test for ascertaining whether such appeal was present in a
publication:
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e.: a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters.41
It is questionable whether the terms "shameful" and "morbid" have
any independent significance and it appears that we are speaking here
simply of material the predominant purpose of which is to sexually
arouse. 42 Assuming this is correct one must ask what interest the state
has in preventing its citizens from being sexually aroused. Particularly
if the danger of stimulating sex thoughts or desires does not justify
state interference, what purpose does the prurient appeal requirement
have? Moveover, non-obscene publications also stimulate thoughts or
desires and probably do so to a greater degree than the obscene insofar
as the average person is concerned. 43 Finally, what difference can it
make to the state whether the material which arouses does or does
not go substantially beyond customary limits of candor?
These inquiries have a dual significance. If the primary objective of
state legislation is to maintain existing moral standards, the prurient
interest appeal-redeeming social importance tests have only limited
relevancy to that objective. The corruption of morals can presumably
be accomplished without any immediate sexual arousal at all by publications which are clearly non-obscene under the Roth test. A film
which alluringly portrays promiscuous conduct as desirable behavior
will, I believe, have a far greater impact on the moral standards of
the average man than hard-core pornography can ever have.
41. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.10 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), now MODEL PENAL

§ 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See generally, Schwartz, Moral Offenses
and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 (1963).
42. It appears reasonably clear that sexual arousal is not what the draftsmen of the
Model Penal Code provision, supra note 41, had in mind. The emphasis was to be on
the nature of the appeal; not the effect of a publication upon the readers. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 40.
43. This proposition has been stressed by Mr. Justice Douglas primarily for the
purpose of showing that obscene utterances did not have any perceptible effect different from non-obscene publications or everyday events. See his opinion in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1967). See also Cairns, Paul and Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN.
CODE

L. REv. 1009 (1962).
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On the other hand, if maintaining a desired moral standard is not a
legitimate and recognized object of governmental legislation there would
appear to be no justification at all for singling out pornography and
permitting the state to suppress it. What harm does it do? As noted
above, the fact that it may cause sexual arousal has no independent
overall significance. Very little concern has been manifested over the
danger of shocking or offending readers. The latter can ordinarily
avoid such impact on his emotions by simply putting aside the book
or magazine, assuming the cover or other promotional material has not
adequately forewarned him.4
A few words need be said concerning the frequently asserted belief
that obscene utterances incite anti-social conduct and the contention
that the validity of regulations in this area should be judged by a clear
and present danger test. Mr. Justice Douglas initially sounded this
theme in his dissent in Rotb,45 and it has been reiterated in subsequent
opinions and law review comments. Speech must be related to conduct
or action before it may be constitutionally penalized or suppressed.
There is no evidence that obscene publications have any effect on conduct beyond perhaps arousing impure thoughts. 46 The burden of proof
should be on the state to show that such publications present a clear
and present danger of overt acts and anti-social conduct.
If the majority of the Court had taken this approach it is obvious
that it could only have arrived at a result wherein all utterances dealing with sex would be wholly immune from state regulation. Proving
a cause and effect relationship between a magazine or movie and a
47
non-consensual criminal act, such as rape, would be indeed difficult.
When one thinks of such penal code violations as fornication or
44. Semonche, supra note 10, at 1207-1208.
45. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
46. "By these standards punishment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not for
overt acts nor anti-social conducts. This test cannot be squared with the First Amendment. Even the ill starred Dennis case conceded that speech must have some relation
to action which could be penalized by government ....
Freedom of expression can be
suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so clearly brigaded with illegal action as
to be an indispensable part of it." Id. at 509 and 514.
47. See Cairns, Paul and Wishner, supra note 43. There is of course some evidence
that a relationship exists. F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover certainly thinks so, Hoover,
Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the F.B.I., 25 U. Prrr L. Rav. 469, (1964).
See also, ST. Jomr-STEvAs, OBSCENITY AND TH LAW (1956); Reiss, The Supreme Court

and Obscenity: Mishkin and Ginzburg-Expansion of Freedom and Improved Regulation Through Flexible Standards of Obscenity, 21 RTTGERs L. REv. 43 (1966), particularly
at 48-49; Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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-adultery the causal connection between the actors and their reading
habits would be impossible to establish, particularly in advance of the
conduct itself. This is, of course, not to say that no relationship
exists. We are after all dealing with one of man's strongest animal
instincts. Common sense dictates that if one tempts a hungry man
with forbidden food or an alcoholic with forbidden beverage there
is a strong probability that a relationship exists between the temptation and the consumption. Who can gainsay that a reader will
not be persuaded by what he reads that he is justified in indulging
his sexual appetite with an illegal act should the occasion arise, and that
the misgivings he might have otherwise had were rationalized away by
the publication. The point need not be belabored. The relationship
either in a specific case or in an overall sense simply cannot be proven.
Furthermore the anti-social conduct may also be inspired by non-obscene
publications, and for the average man the likelihood of being so inspired is probably greater from "ideological obscenity" 48 than from
hard-core pornography, the effect of which is probably only superficial
and transitory.
If it be conceded that no convincing proof exists or is possible that
obscene publications result in a clear and present danger of overt anti.social conduct then the only justification for permitting suppression of
such publications is their assumed pernicious effect on moral character.
We have thus come full circle. If the state has a recognized interest
in the moral character of its citizens it is because the state has a legitimate interest in preserving and maintaining certain standards of morality. That interest is threatened at least as much by non-obscene sex
publications as by the rankest pornography. The fact that material may
be shocking, offensive and primarily aimed at arousing prurient interest
has considerable bearing on its social value perhaps, but is really only
incidental when the primary consideration relates to the long range
effect on individual character and community standards. Here the
governmental interest is actually greater in the case of non-obscene publications. Yet the law as promulgated in Rotb goes in a diametrically
opposite direction. The Court has continued to maintain, at least by
implication, that the tendency of material and the ideas contained therein to corrupt morals does not constitute justification for governmental
regulation when the only tenable basis for permitting state regulation
48. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 29, 38 MiNe. L. REv. 295, 333-334, 474-476
,(1954).
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at all is the state interest in preserving individual morality, in protect49
ing against "sin," as one commentator sees it.
With this fundamental contradiction as the basic predicate it is hardly
surprising that the end result would be a thoroughly confused area
of the law. A brief perusal of several of the decisions subsequent to
Roth will demonstrate that this basic contradiction has led the Court
into its present dilemma, and that an intelligible accommodation is impossible as long as the Court continues to at least try and ride two,
horses pointed in opposite directions.
SUBSEQUENT ACCOIMODATIONS-CONTINUED CONTRADICTION

KINGSLEY INTERNATIONAL PICTURES CORP. V. REGENTS

0

Two years after the decision in Roth the Court was squarely faced
with the issue of what subordinating interest the state has in regulating
publications which adversely effect community moral standards. The
state of New York's motion picture licensing law prohibited the
licensing of a film ". . . of such a character that its exhibition would
tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime." "' A motion picture would fall
into this category if it "portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion,
or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior." 52 The administra49. Henkin, supra note 34:
To me it seems that the unusual confusion-more prevalent than in discussions of other attempts of government to regulate forms of expression
-is due in large measure to misapprehension of the concern and the
interest that inspire government to regulate obscenity. Specifically, I believe, despite common assumptions and occasional rationalizations, that obscenity laws are not principally motivated by a conviction that obscene
materials inspire sexual offenses. Obscenity laws, rather, are based on
traditional notions, rooted in this country's religious antecedents, of governmental responsibility for communal and individual "decency" and "morality."
Communities believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is
wrong for the individual and has no place in a decent society. They believe
too, that adults as well as children are corruptible in morals and character, and that obscenity is a source of corruption that should be eliminated.
Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection of others. Much
of it is suppressed for the purity of the "consumer." Obscenity, at bottom,
is not crime. Obscenity is sin. Id. at 391 and 395.
This brief quotation hardly does justice to Professor Henkin's excellent treatment.
It might be noted that Professor Henkin concludes that suppression of obscenity
is not justified.
50. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
51. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1953).
52. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 122-a (McKinney 1958).
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rive agency involved denied a license to the film "Lady Chatterly's
Lover" on the ground that "the whole theme of this motion picture is
immoral under said law, for that theme is the presentation of adultery
as a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of behavior." 53 The New
York Court of Appeals upheld this action54 on the same basis, that the
film "alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior . . . because its
subject matter is adultery presented as being right and desirable for certain people under certain circumstances." r1 The state court did not find
the film to be obscene within the meaning of the Roth test and did not
find that it would itself incite the viewer to illegal action.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a short opinion written by Mr.
Justice Stewart.56 The opinion acknowledged that the state court's
characterization of the film was correct but nevertheless denied the
state the power to regulate or suppress "ideological obscenity." 57 The
statutory scheme was held invalid on its face.
What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an ideathat adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior.
Yet the First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus struck at the very
heart of constitutionally protected liberty.SS
It is submitted here that the Court's decision struck at the very heart
of the state's primary objective in regulating sex publications. The decision is significant of course in that it represents an express affirmation
of the thesis that a state may exercise control only over hard-core
pornography. Since this type of publication was not involved there was
no reason to consider why a state should be permitted to suppress
pornography and at the same time be totally forbidden from regulating
a publication which concededly has a tendency to corrupt. The emphasis
53. Quoted, 360 U.S. at 685.

54. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State
of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39.

55. Quoted, 360 U.S. at 687.
56. Separate concurring opinions were written by Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark and Harlan but ironically this is one of the few decisions rendered in the
obscenity area without dissenters. Professor Henkin, supra note 34, takes the position
that Kingsley is not really an obscenity case at all, but rather a "moral" case. Id. at
400.
57. See note 48, supra.

58. 360 U.S. at 688.
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as always was on free speech values, the advocacy of ideas. It might
be noted in passing that obscene utterances also convey ideas and,
somewhat ironically, it is probably because of that very fact that the
state seeks to suppress such utterances. The reference to incitement to
overt conduct is of course meaningless. It was undisputed that the
state could not and did not prove that as a result of the exhibition of the
film the incidence of adultery in New York would increase by a given
percentage or that a substantial number of New Yorkers would immediately take up with their neighbor's wives. One can only refer to a
clear and present danger test in this context with tongue in cheek.
The Kingsley decision is significant today in another respect. Now
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court is a movie censorship case
involving very similar issues. 59 A Dallas, Texas, ordinance provides for
the classification of motion pictures by an administrative board and
prohibits the exhibition of a film to minors if it is found to be "not
suitable for young persons." 00 The standards to be applied in making
this determination are as follows: (emphasis supplied)
(1) Describing or portraying brutality, criminal violence or
depravity in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board,
likely to incite or encourage crime or delinquency on the part of
young persons; or
(2) Describing or portraying nudity beyond the customary
limits of candor in the community, or sexual promiscuity or
extramarital or abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as to
be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage
delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons
or to appeal to their prurient interest.
A film shall be considered "likely to incite or encourage" crime,
delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons,
if, in the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial probability
that it will create the impression on young persons that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy
or commonly accepted. A film shall be considered as appealing to
"prurient interest" of young persons, if in the judgment of the
Board, its calculated or dominant effect on young persons is substantially to arouse sexual desire. In determining whether a film
is "not suitable for young persons," the Board shall consider the
59. Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of Dallas, 402 S.W.2d 770, Tex. Civ App. 1966,
probable jurisdiction noted 87 S. Ct. 1685 (1967). See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966), involving the same ordinance.
60. § 46 A-4, Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 11284 (1965).
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film as a whole, rather than isolated portions, and shall determine
'whether its harmful effects outweigh artistic or educationalvalues
such film may have for young persons.61
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld the ordinance and its
application to the film in question. The U.S. Supreme Court holdings
were distinguished on the basis that they all involved complete suppression rather than merely a regulation of publications.0 2 The Court
further held that the requirements of the Roth test were met if "judged
by the average young person" were substituted for "judged by the
average person" although the Court indicated it would hold the same
way were this not the case. The following quotation from a concurring
opinion best expresses the basis of the decision:
It is my firm opinion that the constitutional guaranties of free
speech may not properly be invoked to defeat the worthy purposes of the ordinance in question. The classification of a motion
picture as "not suitable for young persons" is not by the terms
of the ordinance made to depend on whether the motion picture is
obscene, and I do not believe the United States Supreme Court
intended, in Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.
Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 1367, or in other cases to make such a
stringent limitation on the powers of a state or city in this field.
The ordinance under examination, in defining the phrase "not
suitable for young persons," does not employ the words "obscene"
or "obscenity." The portrayal of sexual promiscuity in a motion
picture may be accomplished with such finesse, or in such a subtle
manner, that many would not consider it obscene; yet, by its
very adroitness or subtlety promiscuity would be made to appear
to a young person to be highly desirable or praiseworthy and acceptable or commonly accepted. Conveying to young persons the
idea that to be able to enjoy the pleasures of sexual gratification
61. ld. § 46 A-1.

62. We bow to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. But we do not
believe that the holdings above set out are applicable here. In all of the

cited cases the Court was considering enactments which sought to impose
total censorship. Their effect would have been to ban completely the sale,

distribution or exhibition of the matter involved either to adults or children. The Ordinance we have before us for consideration in this case does
no such thing. As we have already pointed out it does not call for total
censorship in any instance. It simply applies limited regulations of the
conditions under which certain classified pictures may be exhibited to
children under the age of sixteen years. 402 S.W.2d 775-776.
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without being burdened with any accompanying responsibility
or commitment, and with no retributive consequences, or even
the slightest remorse, is acceptable behavior according to accepted
standards of the American community, would in my opinion have
a much more pernicious effect on the morals of the community
than mere obscenities. To say that a community is powerless to
protect itself and its youth from such damage because of the constitutional safeguards of free speech is to my mind unconscionable
3
and unacceptable.
This is not the first time the Court has been met with these contentions, and they have in the past been rejected out of hand.p' Although there are some distinguishing features between this case and
the issues in Kingsley, the rationale of the latter decision would appear
to require a reversal. The ordinance does not refer only to obscene
utterances and expressly requires that the Board balance the pernicious
effect on morals against the artistic and educational value the film
may have. This is the very balancing process the U.S. Supreme Court
totally rejected in Kingsley.
Yet there are now strong indications that the Court will uphold
state laws aimed at protecting the moral character of minors, either by a
manipulation of the Rotb test or perhaps even by permitting an outright
balancing approach. For example, in one of the 1966-1967 term per
curiam opinions the Court referred to the fact that: "In none of the
cases was there a claim that the statute in question reflected a specific
and limited state concern for juveniles." '5 Moreover the members of
the Court are certainly aware of the strong public concern over the
reading and viewing habits of minors. 6 It may be, as Mr. Justice Douglas
suggests, that children would be better off if they were permitted to
63.
64.
65.
66.
195:

402 S.W.2d at 778.
See Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
Redrup v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1414, 1416 (1967), see note 26, supra.
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), the following statement appears at

We recognize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and
localities . . . in preventing the dissemination of material deemed harmful
to children . . . State and local authorities might as well consider whether
their objectives in this area would be better served by laws armed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, rather
than at totally prohibiting its dissemination.
See also Dibble, Obscenity, A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. Rxv.
345 (1966); Note, The New York Law Controlling the Dissemination of Obscene
Materials to Minors, 34 Fom. L. REv. 692 (1966).
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"meet the facts of life and the literature of the world" 67 without restriction, but it is doubtful that this view is or will be accepted by
the majority of parents.
Should the Court acknowledge this overriding state interest in protecting moral character of minors it would obviously be on a basis
other than incitement of overt and-social conduct. Such a holding could
only mean that under certain circumstances the interest of the state in
maintaining moral standards outweighs the free speech values involved
in non-obscene sex publications, quite apart from whether the publications have prurient interest appeal, are patently offensive or present a
clear and present danger of overt acts. The state would be permitted
to meet the "danger of influencing a change in the current moral
standards of the community"0 8 by restricting access to publications
having such a tendency by members of that class which are most easily
influenced and most likely to readily adopt new moral standards. It
is apparent that the Court could hardly continue to maintain the position that publications are either obscene or non-obscene and that those
falling in the latter category are absolutely protected by the guarantee
of free speech. In fact, as is pointed out below, the Court has already
abandoned this position.
GINZBURG0 9 AND MISHKIN70

Ginzburg involved an appeal from a conviction and five-year prison
sentence based upon violations of a federal statute.7 1 The defendant
had been found guilty of mailing three separate publications, Eros,
Liaison and the Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity. The
conviction was upheld in a five-man majority opinion,7 not on the basis
67. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D & C, 101, 110, quoted with approval in
Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 431 n.10 (concurring opinion).
68. Supra note 1.
69. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
70. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The statute is the same one that was involved in Roth
v. United States. See note 16 supra.
72. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brennan. Mr. Justice Black
dissented in an opinion in which he stressed that the Roth test was overly vague
and meaningless and that the defendant was jailed for distributing matter that neither
he nor anyone else could know was obscene and would subject him to imprisonment.
He reiterated his position that all censorship was illegal. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in a combined opinion in both Ginzburg and Mishkin. His opinion stressed
the prurient interest appeal and social value elements of the Roth test and concluded
that the materials involved clearly had social value. Mr. Justice Stewart also dissented
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that the publications involved were obscene in the Roth sense, but because of the methods employed by the defendant in disseminating the
publications. Ginzburg was found to have been engaged in "pandering
...the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers." " This exploitation of "the widespread weakness for titillation by pornography" 74
is not protected by the First Amendment. Even when the material
itself is not pornographic the disseminator may be prosecuted (one
writer has suggested the basis is analogous to traditional estoppe17 5)
if he himself emphasizes "the sexually provocative interests of the work,
in order to catch the salaciously disposed." "
The Ginzburg decision has been rather severely criticized on a number of grounds. 7 Whether one agrees with the outcome or not it can
hardly be denied that the rationale is inherently contradictory. If the
material itself is not obscene by what logic can one justify imprisoning
the publisher under an obscenity statute for truthfully advertising his
product? If candid discussions of sex are constitutionally protected,
it is difficult to perceive why the individual who publishes these protected discussions can be criminally prosecuted simply because he advises prospective purchasers that his publications contain candid discussions of sex. By shifting the focus of attention from the material
itself and emphasizing the conduct of the purveyor, an approach initially
suggested by Chief Justice Warren in Rot, 78 the majority obviously
sought to avoid the First Amendment issue but this maneuver is too
obvious. The decision reflects the consequences of the Court's failure
to deal candidly with the underlying issues. Even assuming that the
case can be treated as one involving only the regulation of conduct,
in both cases on the basis that none of the material involved in either Ginzburg or
Mishkin was hard-core pornography. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented only in Ginzburg. He
found that the statute involved was not a pandering statute and the defendant's rights
were violated by a conviction under a statute that did not by its terms apply to
-the conduct of the defendant. He also reiterated a position he had taken in Roth, that
.state convictions should be treated differently in this area and should be reviewed
.by the Court only in extreme cases.
73. 383 U.S. at 467.
74. Id. at 471, quoting from Schwartz, supra note 41, at 677.
75. Dyson, supra note 11, at 11.
76. 383 U.S. at 473.
77. See articles cited, supra note 11.
78. See note 17, supra. It took almost ten years but the Chief Justice did succeed
in converting four other justices to his point of view. The influence of the Chief
Justice is discussed briefly in Semonche, supra note 10, at 1181.
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the rationale still fails to elucidate the state interest which is paramount
to a publisher's liberty to cater to the desires of a substantial segment
of the public. There is certainly no showing that the defendant's activities caused harm to society or incited anyone to commit anti-social
acts. There is not even here a showing of sexual arousal resulting from
the illegal conduct. What legitimate and overriding interest did the
state assert which in the eyes of the Court justified this deprivation
of liberty?
I submit that what the majority did in Ginzburg was to recognize
that the state's interest in maintaining certain standards of morality
outweigh the free speech values involved where the publisher brazenly
assails those standards. The Court has in effect admonished the publisher that while he may advocate ideas that are morally corrupting
and disseminate material that is appealing to prurient interest or patently
offensive, his First Amendment rights from this point on are subject
to and limited by the governmental interest in protecting community
moral standards. He can publish the material but he cannot flaunt it
in the face of this state interest. Free speech values are adequately
protected by the right to place the publication on the market-anything
beyond this constitutes an unprotected encroachment upon a legitimate
state concern.
I believe this is the only reasonable explanation of this rather extraordinary decision. It is certainly difficult to accept the proposition that
Ginzburg represents only an application of the Roth principles. A
person's conduct, as such, is relevant to the validity of a police power
exercise only when that conduct in some way endangers a legitimate
objective of the police power. The only apparent objective affected by
the defendant's activity is the maintenance of a "healthy" moral climate,
and it is this objective that the majority must have had in mind.
I express no opinion over whether this accommodation is either desirable or workable or whether it would have met with greater ap-.
proval had the Court expressly rationalized the decision in terms of a
balancing test. Perhaps the majority wisely declined to plunge into thecontroversy over the right of the state to regulate private consensual
conduct and individual morality. 79 The Court would then be confronted with the problem of how to ascertain and evaluate the effectof publications on moral standards. Such an approach would also re79. See Henkin, supra note 34; Schwartz, supra note 41;
MORALITY

(1963);

DEVLIN,

TmE

EiFORCEmENT

oF

Mocracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. RFv. 635 (1962).

HART, LAW, LIBERTY ANDMoRALs (1959); Devlin, Law, De-
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quire the outright repudiation of the rationale of Roth and subsequent
decisions such as Kingsley.
In Mishkin the majority8 ° made further inroads on the Roth doctrine
by adopting a "variable obscenity" 81 test to be applied where the publications are directed at a specific class of readers or viewers.
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated
to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than to the public
at large, the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied
to
if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
82
the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group.
This shifting person test again removes the primary emphasis from"
the publication itself, and for the first time requires an inquiry into the
characteristics of the intended recipients. The majority opinion speaks
only in terms of prurient appeal and does not even allude to the possible
harm such publications may cause. In this respect the decision differs
little from Roth and is subject to the same observations, although it is
noteworthy that in neither Mishkin nor Ginzburg did the Court elaborate upon the redeeming social importance factor, the keystone of the
Roth rationale. Nevertheless, I believe it is apparent that Mishkin represents another accommodation, a recognition of the state's special concern with the character of those members of society deemed to be more
susceptible to moral corruption than the average man. One can only
80. The opinion was again written by Mr. Justice Brennan and was this time joined
also by Mr. Justice Harlan. The position of the three dissenting justices is essentially
the same as in Ginzburg. See note 72, supra.
81. The theory of variable obscenity developed by Professors Lockhart & McClure,
5upra note 29, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960) at 69-86.
Under variable obscenity, material is judged by its appeal to and effect upon
the audience to which the material is primarily directed. In this view,
material is never inherently obscene; instead, its obscenity varies with the
circumstances of its dissemination. Id. at 77. The "effect" referred to is pre-

sumably prurient interest arousal.
Note that some lower federal courts had prior to the Mishkin decision made an effort
to apply a variable obscenity approach. See, in particular, United States v. Klaw,
350 F.2d 155 (2nd Cir. 1965); United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture

Film Entitled "491," 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). However in Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to adopt the test

although it did not expressly reject it. See Elias, Obscenity, the Law, a Dissenting
Voice, 51 Ky. L. J. 611, 619-624 (1963).
82. 383 U.S. at 508. The Court points out that the use of an "average person"

standard in Roth was for the negative purpose of rejecting the old "most susceptible
person" test of Regina v. Hicldin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868)

and that the Court was

now simply adjusting to social realities by adopting the variable obscenity standard.
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speculate with respect to the eventual application of the principle of
variable obscenity, but it appears that the person who deals in publications catering to the interests of sexual deviates will find his free speech
rights rather severely limited.
It has not been my purpose to analyze these two decisions other than
in the context of demonstrating the reconciliation of competing interests
effected by the Court. What the Court said in these cases is obviously
not as important as what the Court did. While continuing to maintain
the position that free speech could not be regulated or suppressed by
the state to prevent corruption of morals, the holdings themselves belie
this position and reflect a new balance struck in favor of the state's
regulatory power. It would appear, moreover, that these new accommodations have compounded the confusion which already existed, a
certainly undesirable side effect. It was not really very difficult to identify hard-core pornography once it was established that it was only this
class of publications that the Court had in mind in Rotb, quite apart
from the inherent vagueness of the verbal formula provided for that
purpose. It is going to be considerably more difficult to apply the
Ginzburg and Misbkin principles using only the enigmatic concept of
prurient interest appeal as a working tool.
CONCLUSION

The Court's dilemma is a very real one. It is charged with the respon-sibility of accommodating the governmental interest in maintaining
moral standards with the guarantees of the First Amendment. It has
attempted to accomplish this objective without expressly acknowldeging the validity of such governmental interest, and by the use of a verbal
formula which bears little relationship to that interest. To compound this
delicate and complex problem of balancing rival values, there are vaguely worded laws, a dearth of adequate knowledge concerning the effect
of sex publications on overt conduct or moral standards, a brewing controversy over the right of the state to regulate even conduct for the sole
purpose of preventing immorality, publishers all too eager to take full
advantage of an opportunity to exploit the public's desire for sex and
more sex and, finally, censors, all too ready to censor if given the
authority.
To many the issues could be quite simply resolved by wholly
denying the validity of the state concern. This I submit is an extreme
position which if adopted would only engender extreme reactions and
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undesirable "vigilante" activity. Nor is it feasible to permit unrestrained
censorship. The task has been to find a middle ground, to formulate
principles which will preserve the essential values of the First Amendment, and also recognize the right of the state to protect its interests by
authorizing it to draw lines beyond which the publisher may not legally
venture. This may not be the result desired by many, indeed the limited
restrictions on speech permitted by the Roth decision were considered
unjustified particularly by those who espouse an absolutist approach to
First Amendment guarantees. Nevertheless, I believe the only tenable
position the Court can take in fulfilling its responsibility is one which
takes account of both sets of values involved.
I have, therefore, no criticism of the accommodation at which the
Court has arrived, but unfortunately thus far the justices have been
unable to translate that accommodation into governing principles that
accurately reflect the basis of the Court's holdings, an inability that I
maintain is due in large part to the inadequacy of the prurient interest
concept either as an intelligible explanation of the Court's decisions
or as a guide for applying these holdings to concrete cases. I submit
that in the long run the law will be better served by an express adoption
and application of a balancing test in this area, even though this would
require that the Court undertake the truly formidable task of candidly
evaluating on a case to case basis the extent and nature of the state's
interest in avoiding moral corruption and under what circumstances
that interest will be paramount to free speech values.

